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CHAPTER FIVE

SUBJECTIVITY AND OBJECTIVITY

SECTION I: SUBJECTIVITY AND OBJECTIVITY DEFINED

Public Obiectivity
Objectivity, the property of being an object of human knowledge, has
many senses. In the first place, it can mean the property of being valid
for a general public; its contrary being the subjectivity of the private,
individual and incommunicable act. This kind of objectivity, which we
call public obiectivity, is necessary for objects of natural science. There
are, however, two kinds of public objectivity. One belongs to an idea
(or concept), and the other belongs to a reality in its World. The former
is that property possessed by an exact and precise definition, nanlely,
of being independent of particular places, times and factual occurrences;
this belongs not to any World of the real, but to the reahn of ideas.
The latter, however, belongs to a shared World of real things. It is the
object of factual judgements, founded upon perception and – unlike
the precision of an idea – it is accompanied by an irreducible element
of impreciseness and indeterminateness.
Public objectivity, as Kant saw it, is based upon the presence of
pure synthetic a priori features in our knowledge. Such features are the
of intuition", the "anticipations of experience", the
gies of experience" and the "postulates of empirical thought in
general" 1. Euclidean geometry, causality (in the sense of
consequent legality between successive phenomena), the permanence
of
were universal and necessary aspects of scientific
thought because, for Kant, they belonged to the intentionality
structure of every scientific question. Heisenberg, on the other hand,
points out again and again that relativity and quantum mechanics have
shown that it is sufficient if the conditions just described be universal
1 1. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (London, Macmillan,
1963), pp. 194-256.
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only in a well-defined domain and necessary only as a matter of fact.
That is, the Kantian synthetic a priori elements of natural science give
no more than a possible and hypothetical ground for the construction
of a scientific object; a process of empirical testing has to be employed
to ascertain whether or not the possible and hypothetical ground is an
explanation in fact in this domain and where the boundaries of its
domain of applicability are to be found.
Besides the Kantian a priori, there are also other a priori elements
which can ground the public objectivity of a scientific object. These
are the forms of possible physical theories, mathematical structures
for the most part, suggested by empirical data and originating in acts
of creative enriching insight. These theories are a priori to experience,
not in the sense that they are antecedent to all experience like Kant's
Pure Science of Nature, but because they are 'antecedent to the
process of empirical testing on the basis of which alone a theory is
accepted or rejected. A theory has the structure of an ideal norm
composed of a self-defining set of relations. Because the norms are
ideal and do not involve acts of perception, these may be shared by a
community of scientists who speak the same scientific language, and
who can make independent tests of any theory irrespective of par
ticular places and times. The theoretical entities or objects constructed
by this process have a comnlon and public value which defines a kind
of objectivity which we are tempted to call scientific objectivity, but,
since we envisage the problem of such entities
within the broader
,
context of being, we prefer to use the
, public Objectivity.
In the second place, let us distinguish from one another, several
classes of public objects and their noumenal correlates.
Thing
The first class of public objects is an object which is a unity, identity,
whole and the stable subject of properties; it may be either an object
given in perception or a constructed object, like an
which
is linked by us to reality through observable symbols. In either case,
the transcendent being correlated with this object, if such exists, is
called by us a thing. A subdivision of thing is body.
Body

The second class of public objects is a phenomenal object, to which
corresponds a body (in the strict sense) as its noumenal correlate. A
phenomenal object belongs to the class of objects which, as Husserl
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said, are
primordially in perception". It might be described as
a stable subject of perceptible properties in a spatially organised
World. Allied to the notion of body as the transcendent correlate of a
phenomenal– and, therefore, perceptible– object, there are two limiting
concepts which we shall include under the name body: they are:
(I) whatever is conceived to have determinate spatial coordinates
at each instant – as, for example, a classical body or a classical
particle – even though it might not be perceptible, and (2) a field
which is conceived to be an infinitely extended medium for three
dimensional wave motions. These last two classes of objects enter
the sphere of reality through their respective observable symbols.
Empirical Objectivity
The kind of objectivity which is based upon the exteriority of
subject and object in perception is given by us the name empirical
objectivity. This is divided into phenomenal objectivity for the phenome
nal object) and bodily objectivity (for a body). This kind of object,
however, is not so constituted by the act of knowing that it is entirely
separated from or independent of all subjectivity; exteriority implies
its correlate interiority, viz., of a subject. It is
always an object
for-me.
Formal Objectivity
While it would evidently be contradictory to state that within the
relation of bodily or phenomenal objectivity a
could simul
taneously be the subject and object of knowledge; there is a kind of
objectivity in which even the subject can know itself objectively: we
call this formal objectivity. This is an objectivity constituted by an
affirmation which simply releases it from dependence on a knowing
subject as such. It belongs to whatever is affirmed as a virtually un
conditioned object on the basis of evidence. In physics, this evidence
is provided by a process of testing and verification. This kind of object
we call an object in the strict or formal sense; for its intention is simply
to express what is, independently of the act whereby I know it as an
object-for-me. The noumenal correlate of an object in the strict or
formal sense (or a strict object) is an individual existing being, or a
relation between individual existing beings.
Although formal objectivity according to its definition is different
from both bodily and public objectivity, it is nevertheless implied by
both of these types and is in fact an essential element of both. For the
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bodily object which is out there, exterior to me as a bodily subject, is
also – except in phenomenalist metaphysics – affirmed to have an
existence independently of the relation of exteriority which it has
acquired to myself as a knowing subject. The relation of exteriority to
a knowing bodily subject is not constitutive of the body-in-itself, but
is a relation added to some absolute ground which exists (we may not
know how or by what) independently of its phenomenal presentation
within the field of my perception. Even pure phenomenalism however
cannot escape formal objectivity; for the very positing of phenome
nalism as a true philosophy is an act whose sense is to separate a certain
mental content from its dependence on my or any subjectivity. This
mental content is an object to which the relation of bodily exteriority
simply does not apply: it has, however, public objectivity.
Public objectivity also implies formal objectivity and contains it
within itself. There are two kinds of public objectivity: of an idea and
of a reality in its World. We are here concerned with ideas only in so
far as they are asserted or affirmed of something given in experience
and hence as a property of a real situation within a World. An idea how
ever may state the relation of a thing to a knowing subject or a relation
existing between things. In either case, the terms of the relation are
presupposed by the relation and posited in some way to exist inde
pendently of their relation to my subjectivity; that is, the relation to
my subjectivity is merely the means through which some absolute
ground makes itself present to me in my experience. This is very
evident in the case of ideas which, like physical properties, express
thing-to-thing relations; for even, if it should be argued that the
relation generates its own terms, neither of the terms of a thing-to-thing
relation is (in physics) a knowing subject and hence the positing of such
a relation satisfies the definition of formal objectivity in a special way.
These considerations however suggest an important question: Is
formal objectivity to be atrributed equally to every aspect of the
public object? Or are there aspects to which public objectivity can be
correctly attributed but which lack nevertheless
objectivity?
Let us recall that it is sufficient for a public object merely that it be
understood, recognised and described by all in the same way. Conse
quently, public objectivity does not require that a priori subjective
elements, if there are any, which are common to a certain way of
knowing but are nevertheless extrinsic to that which is formally and
strictly affirmed, should be consciously distinguished from the content
of that which is strictly affirmed. These a priori elements of the public
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object belong to the intentionality-structure of the knowing in so far
as this is a human method of doing scientific research, and they
constitute the matrix in which the strict object makes its appearance.
The disengagement of the strict object from its setting of scientific
methodology is, we believe, one of the principal epistemological
problems of quantum mechanics, and we reserve this problem for
section III of the present chapter.
Reality and its Criterion
Let us distinguish, moreover, the meaning of the term "reality"
from the criterion of reality with reference to a certain knower. The
former defines what is meant by the term. The latter is that on account
of which a thing is said by a certain knower to be real: in our case, it
is the sign through which its reality is manifested to us. In the ration
alist intentionality-structure of classical physics, "reality" means "a
body in the strict sense (but with idealised boundaries and coordinates),
or whatever agrees with the limiting concepts of classical particle or
classical field". Its criterion is the appearance in experience of an
appropriate – if vague – indication of its presence such as, e.g., the
recording of a non-vanishing field intensity. In the empiricist view,
«reality" means "whatever is here and now perceived as a body in the
strict sense". For it, the meaning and the criterion of reality are
identified. Anticipating a later section, let us state here our own view
for the sake of completeness: (1) the criterion
physical reality in
regard of a human knower is not identical with its meaning, since
we have no intellectual intuition of physical reality; (2) the meaning
of "reality" is "whatever is defined by the object in the formal sense",
while (3) its criterion is a manifestation of its presence through ob
servable symbols, and critically judged to be such, within a World of
real things.
Subjectivity
Just as there are many kinds of objectivity, so there are many kinds
of subjectivity. This we define to be the absence of a corresponding kind
of objectivity. There is then (i) a subjectivity which is an absence
empirical objectivity. This may be either the type of interiority which is
the strict correlate of the exteriority of an empirical object, or simply
a lack of bodily objectivity. The latter is one of the senses in which the
quantum mechanical system is said to be non-objective. (ii) There is
subjectivity which is an absence of public objectivity. This is the sub
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jectivity of unshared or incommunicable private experience or obser
vation. This too is said to be a new and inescapable factor of quantum
mechanical science. Finally, (iii) there is a subjectivity which is the
absence of sufficient evidence for the virtually unconditioned affirmation
of a strict object. This is the subjectivity attached to a mere supposition
or hypothesis.

I

SECTION II: EMPIRICAL OBJECTIVITY

Objectivity and Exteriority
Quantum mechanics denies that an atomic physical system is
objectifiable as a body; i.e., it says that a quantum mechanical system
does not possess precisely determinable space-time coordinates and
momenta independently of particular acts of measurement and
observation. The denial in question refers to the public empirical
objectivity of a body. This is a direct consequence of the Principle of
Complementarity. "Science", as Heisenberg said, "no longer confronts
nature as an objective observer" 1; the objects of science are not bodies,
existing out there in isolated exteriority to the knowing subject. From
this denial of the exteriority of the object, Heisenberg went to the
opposite extreme and concluded that the object was really an interior
act:
object of research is no longer nature itself, but man's
investigation of nature. Here... man
himself alone" 2.
The failure of an objectivity founded upon exteriority alone, how
ever, does not entail as a necessary consequence the kind of interiority
in which "man confronts himself alone"; for there is a third possibility,
viz., a more discriminating critique of the subject-object relation in
science, and a better analysis of the structure of the scientific object
in the strict or formal sense 3.
A more careful analysis of the subject-object relations shows that
Heisenberg, Physicist's Conception of Nature, p. 29.
Ibid., p. 24.
.
3 That the principal kind of objectivity envisaged by most physicists is one based upon
the relation of exteriority, is illustrated by von Neumann's account of the measuring process
(Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics, chap. VI, especially pp. 420-421). Here
he uses the principle of psycho-physical parallelism to establish the distinction and relation
between subject and object in the measuring process; the division between the two, in his
account, is evidently a spatial division, which he called the Schnitt or boundary. "That the
boundary can be pushed arbitrarily deeply into the interior of the actual observer is the
content of the principle of psycho-physical parallelism ... , but this does not change the fact
that in each method of description the boundary must be put somewhere" (my italics), ibid.,
p. 420. Heisenberg paraphrases this passage in Niels Bohr etc., p. 27.
1

2
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there are many different kinds based upon a variety of different
differentiating relations. The exteriority of a body vis-à-vis a human
knower as a bodily subject is not the only kind of objectivity which a
scientific object can have. In fact, it would be a serious misunder
standing of scientific method to state that objectivity of this kind
belongs essentially to a physical system as known. This was one of
the errors of the intentionality-structure of classical physics.
Empirical objectivity belongs to a unity, identity whole which is
perceived as
a physical system, however, is a thing, i.e., a unity,
identity whole which is the subj ect of physical properties. We have
already shown that physical properties are not defined relative to
perception, but relative to a self-correlated set of interactions between
things. It follows from this that neither a physical property nor a
physical system contains in its definition anything that relates it
intrinsically to elements of perception. Comparing the definition of a
physical system with that of a body, we see that the former in no way
implies – though it does not exclude – that it be a body. What actually
is perceived by a scientist is a complex of bodies and bodily properties
which comprise the measuring apparatus. This is the context in which
the observable symbol occurs, which is the criterion that manifests
to us the reality of a quantum mechanical system. That the physical
system should itself be one of the bodies of this complex is not required
by the physical theory.
The failure of empirical objectivity for microscopic systems, then,
is not only understandable, but it might well have been anticipated
by a more careful analysis of scientific method. We do not mean to say
that Heisenberg's Indeterminacy Relations should have been predicted
on the basis of an analysis of scientific method; for this is founded upon
new empirical data; but that the rearguard action in favour of theories
of a "classical sort" should have been dropped long ago, and for reasons
based upon the logic of scientific method.

SECTION III: PUBLIC OBJECTIVITY

Heisenberg and Public Objectivity

Public objectivity, as we have seen, is a necessary condition of
science; since, without it, there could be no scientific community, no
scientific language and no collaboration towards well-defined goals.
I t is surprising, then, that many physicists should find that the
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possibility of this kind of objectivity is restricted by the fonnal
structure of quantum mechanics.
Heisenberg never doubted the public objectivity of quantum
mechanics. It was for him one of the indubitable facts which were the
starting point of his philosophy. "The physicist", he wrote, "must
postulate in his science that he is studying a world which he hinlself
has not made, and which would be present, essentially unchanged, if
he were not there" 1. The critical problem in the philosophy of science,
as Heisenberg saw it, was to express the a priori conditions of possi
bility –both subjective and objective– of a science which, like quantum
mechanics, contradicted so many of the universal and necessary con
ditions accepted both as a part of pure science and as a part of phi
losophy since the time of Kant.
The contrast between the public objectivity of quantum physics as
a science and the "subjective element" in the acts which comprise the
exercise of this science, is brought out in many parts of Heisenberg's
writings. "The objective reality of the elementary particle has been
strangely dispersed", he wrote, "not into the fog of some ill-defined
or still unexplained conception of reality, but into the transparent
clarity of a mathematics which no longer describes the behaviour of
elementary particles, but only our knowledge of their behaviour" 2.
Again in his celebrated article contributed to the collection, Niels Bohr
and the Development of Physics (1955), he wrote: "This representation
[of a closed system by a ray in Hilbert space] ... is completely
'objective', i.e., it no longer contains features connected with the
observer's knowledge, but it is also completely abstract and incompre
hensible since the mathematical expression PHI(q), PHI(p), etc., do not
refer to real space or to a real property, it thus, so to speak, contains
no physics at all" 3. Such a description is "complete and objective" but
"not real". To make this a "description of Nature" it has to be linked
to the question of "how real or possible experiments will result". The
interaction of the system with the measuring apparatus is described
mathematically by a mixture and "thus the description contains,
besides its objective features, ... information about the extent of the
observer's knowledge of the system" 4. This latter, he calls, the
"subjective element" in our knowledge of nature; since a mixture
gives only "incomplete information" about the actual state of the

3

Heisenberg, Niels Bohr etc., p. 24.
Heisenberg, Physicist's Conception of Nature, p. 15.
Heisenberg, Niels Bohr etc., pp. 26-27.

4

Ibid.
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object. The
element" in question belongs to the sphere of
the private experience of the observer.
The Subjective Element"
For Heisenberg, the ((subjective element" in quantum mechanics
is twofold: (1) the failure of empirical objectivity (in the sense of
classical physics) for quantum mechanical systems, and (2) the failure
of public obj ectivity in quantum mechanics resulting in an insur
mountable subjective barrier limiting public knowledge of atomic
systems to irreducibly probabilistic laws.
The failure of empirical objectivity led to a rejection of the rationalist
view of reality. One would think that Heisenberg, like Bohr, swung
to the other extreme, of outright empiricism. This is ipdeed the im
pression one receives – for example, from his insistence that reality is
encountered only in what is actually experienced, Le., in "observation
events", and that the true description of reality is always of happenings
in three-dimensional space. His original insight on the importance of
observables in physics contained, as we have already shown, a strong
empirical element. However, Heisenberg, the theoretical physicist, had
a strong rationalist bias and this led him eventually to an explicit
rejection of empiricism. Being persuaded of the rationality of nature,
he saw in Berkeley and Locke an abdication of the power of reason 1.
We shall examine in another chapter the attempts he made to overcome
this twofold crisis 2.
The outcome of this tension in Heisenberg was a synthesis of the two
dialectical extremes by means of a Kantian distinction between an
empirical reality represented by the phenomenal object and a noumenal
reality or thing-in-itself, which would be the content of an intellectual
intuition of physical reality, if we had such an intuition. However,
Heisenberg surmises that we have no such intellectial intuition and
consequently that reality in the sense of thing-in-itself is formally
unknowable by us. Nevertheless, we are not deprived of all contact with
noumenal reality, since human reason and empirical intuition preserve
a symbolic vestige of it in so far as they are related by their activity
to an unspecified noumenal correlate. Rationalism and empiricism are
both rejected but ultimately reconciled on the deeper level of the
knowing subject where they express different aspects of the dynamic
structure of human intentionality. The outcome of this is to divide the
1

2

Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy, p. 83.
Infra, chap. VIII.
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meaning of
into two: a phenomenal reality defined as the
object of categorised empirical intuition, and a noumenal reality defined
as the object of a kind of intellectual intuition which we do not possess.
meanings of
Originally, for Heisenberg, these were the only
reality. The quantum mechanical system, however, does not fulfil
either meaning. Although every observation-event of a quantum
mechanical system terminates in the empirical realities of the
measuring instrument and its response, no well-defined permanent and
causally-related phenomenal object can be formed of the quantum
mechanical system and, ' consequently – assuming parallelism – no
well-defined noumenal correlate exists. The failure of the quantum
mechanical system to satisfy either of the two definitions of "reality",
was for a long time blamed by Heisenberg on a radical insufficiency
of the human knowing subject. Knowing neither the empirical nor the
noumenal reality of the quantum mechanical system, the human
knower was forced to represent it by an artificially constructed idea,
no physics at
1. In later
viz., the wave function, which
years, Heisenberg proposed a third and new meaning for the term
"reality", to which he gave the names "potentia", "objective tenden
cy", or "objective possibility". This was neither a pure idea, nor an
actual event (an empirical object), but it was a real possibility of
producing ideal frequencies 2.
The root cause of Heisenberg's perplexity is to be found in his inade
quate theory of knowledge and scientific
and particularly in
an underlying parallelism which assumes that the reality of a physical
system or property is either the direct object of an act of observation
(a phenomenal reality) or something directly correlated with it in a
parallelistic sense (a body or the kind of bodily property which is
founded upon a thing-to-us relation). If this is assumed, then, the
quantum mechanical system, to which no stable and coherent em
two senses
pirical object corresponds, is not real in either of
discussed. The direct object of an act of observation is not, however,
as we have shown, the reality of the physical system. 'It is merely its
observable symbol. The lack of coherence of a set of sensible
symbols (in this case, of two mutually exclusive sets, namely,
discrete or particle symbols and continuous or field symbols) does
not imply a lack of coherence in the thing symbolised. Moreover,
the connection between the observable symbol and reality is not one
1
2

Ibid.

Cf.,

p. 13; Physics and Philosophy, pp. 41, 53, 70, 91 and 185.
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of parallelism in the usual sense for, if this were so, reality would be as
incoherent as the symbol; its relation to reality is far more complicated
and will be discussed in chapter IX.
As for the irreducibly probabilistic nature of quantum mechanical
laws, we have stated our view that this does not imply such an
incursion of private subjectivity that our power of knowing reality
suffers an essential check at the quantum level. Probabilistic laws do
not spring from ignorance nor from the inescapable perturbation of an
object by an observer-subject, but they arise as a necessary conse
quence of our abstractive mode of knowing individual and concrete
things. Only an ideal norm can be defined precisely by the human mind.
This always has the structure of a law from which concrete cases
diverge only randomly. Random deviations lead to statistical laws.
Hence, quantum mechanics, in which we find the organic union of
both statistical and deterministic laws, expresses the most general form
in which a scientific theory can be expressed by a human investigator.
We shall return to these points later on.

Problem of Public Objectivity in Quantum Mechanics
For many physicists, however, the logic of quantum mechanics leads
to the conclusion that quantum mechanics is concerned with the
private act of observation of a scientific observer and that, moreover,
this private act is capable of destroying previously existing correlations
and so of effecting public and observable
in the course of
nature. Under these circumstances, the public objectivity of science
is put in jeopardy.
To illustrate this problem, we shall use an example adapted from
Heisenberg, changing the conditions a little in order to bring out the
salient points better, but following the line of Heisenberg's argument 1.
In our exposition, we shall keep as close as possible to Heisenberg's
language, thought and manner of interpreting the experiment. In the
next sub-section, we shall analyse more fully the
"expressed.
Let us consider a beam of atoms all prepared in the state
(for
example, of magnetic moment m) which is passed in succession
through two inhomogeneous fields F 1 and F 2. Transitions take place
during the passage through each field. The two fields are accompanied
by separating fields which separate the different states into different
beams so that an observation made on the relative position of the atom
by an observer is equivalent to an observation of state (see figure).
1

Heisenberg, Physical Principles etc., pp. 59-62.
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There is an observer (observer "One") placed at an intennediate
position between F 1 and F 2 ; and a second observer (observer "Two")
placed on the far side of F2. Each observer has an apparatus designed
to measure an atom's position, which, for him, is an index of the
magnetic moment of the passing atom.
Each act of observation has two moments: an exchange of at
least one photon with the atom, and a conscious act taking cognizance
of the result. We call the whole act, the act of observation, and the latter
part, the conscious act 01 observation. The action of the separating fields
with the act of observation constitute the lull act of measurement.
According to Heisenberg, three cases
- Case I: Observer "One"
does not make an observation. The entire experimental set-up is then
considered to be an isolated system and consequently to be in possession
of a pure case wave function 1. The transition probability from state
to state
in the experiment in this case is:

(I)
where Smj and S* jn are the matrix elements for transitions during the
passage of F 1 and F 2 respectively.
~
We shall discuss below why it is significant for the result (I) that the
observer "One" avoid interaction with the passing atom.
Case II: Observer "One" allows his apparatus to interact with the
passing atom but fails to make a conscious act of observation. The
system splits into two independent systems, annihilating the inter
ference of probability waves, and the transition probability from "m"
1

Cf. supra, pp. 71-76, a nd Appendix .
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becomes in this case:
(II)

A mixture is formed when the apparatus is separated from the measured
object, and all correlations except the one-to-one correlation between
the states of the apparatus and the states of the object are destroyed.
We shall discuss below whether and in what sense we can speak of
the transformation of a pure case into a mixture apart from the two
stages in the act of observation, or apart from the communication of
the result to others.
Case III: Observer "One" observes that the state of the passing atom
is "j", and communicates his knowledge. The total transition proba
bility from state
to state
is in this case:
(III)
The difference in form between (I) and (II) shows that some differ
ence exists between Case I and Case II. The difference is in the
transformation of the pure case into a mixture at the intermediate
position in Case II. Heisenberg implies that the transformation from
the pure case into a mixture is a physical effect like the filtering of
a liquid – and is produced by the "partly undefined interactions of the
measuring apparatus" 1. He assumes that the difference in Case II is
to the conscious act of observation. It is clear that he wishes
thereby to save the public objectivity of quantum mechanics. Note that
Heisenberg regards the
of the wave packet" – which is the
final result of the measuring-process – as occurring in two steps:
(1) the formation of the mixture, which is prior to the act of obser
vation, and (2) the act of observation which ascertains or "registers"
which of the possible states has been actualised 2. We shall be
concerned in the next sub-section with the question, in what sense the
formation of the mixture is a physical process like the filtering of a
liquid, and in what sense it is dependent on whether or not the
observer-scientist makes a conscious act before or after the measure
ment.
Heisenberg, Niels
etc., p. 23; also Physical Principles etc., p. 60.
Commenting on Einstein's thought-experiment of the semi-transparent mirror, Heisen
berg says that "the experiment at the position of the reflected wave packet, exerts a kind
of action (reduction of the wave packet) at the distant point occupied by the transmitted
packet, and one sees that this act is propagated with a velocity greater than that of light",
Physical Principles etc., p. 39.
1

2
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in which the observer-subject interacts with the object and undergoes
a prise de conscience of this experience. If this interpretation is to be
consistent, then the point of division (or Schnitt) on the connected
chain of physical processes which unites the object to the observing
subject must be capable of being displaced arbitrarily. Whether this
point lies outside the body of the observer-subject or inside it should
be immaterial to the physical result 1.
Logically implied in Reisenberg's view of the measuring process
is the position that the behaviour and pattern of objects in human
empirical consciousness are also subject to quantum mechanical laws.
Acts are specified by their objects. If then the object of empirical
consciousness is identical with reality, and if reality is subject to the
quantum theory, then the behaviour and pattern of objects in human
empirical consciousness is also subject to quantum mechanical laws.
The quantum theory then takes on the character of a universal expla
nation for physical and mental events 2. Von Neumann is quite explicit
on this point: " It is a fundamental requirement of the scientific
viewpoint – the so-called principle of psycho-physical parallelism – that
it must be possible so to detennine the extraphysical process of the
subjective perception as if it were in reality in the physical world" 3.
Returning to the difference between Case I and Case II: let us state
the dilemma in the following way 4. If observer "One" makes an
observation but fails to communicate its result, what, he
ask, is
the correct state of the passing atom? Observer
is in a quandary.
He does not know whether to treat the case as (a) a pure case of the
total isolated system (including observer "One" in the isolated system),
or (b) whether to suppose that a mixture was fonned at the inter
mediate stage. The orthodox physicist says that the latter (b) is the
correct alternative. However, if observer "One" were replaced by a
non-conscious piece of apparatus, then the orthodox physicist would
say that the former (a) is the correct solution. Wigner says of this
dilemma: "The argument for the difference in the roles of
observation tools and observers with a consciousness –
for a
1 Heisenberg, Niels Bohr etc., p. 27: also von Neumann, Mathematical Foundations etc.,
pp. 4 18-420.
2 Cf. E. P. Wigner, "Remarks on the Mind-Body Problem", The Scientist Speculates,
pp. 284-301: Abner Shimony, Am. Jour. Phys., XXXI (1963), pp. 755-773.
3 Von Neumann, Mathematical Foundations etc., pp. 418-419.
4 We are adapting for the purposes of our example Wigner's treatment of a similar
problem and discussed by him in his article referred to in note 2 above. Cf. also, "Theorie
der quantenmechanischen Messung" , Physikertagung, Wien, I96I (Mosbach/Baden: 1962),
p. 1; "The Possibility of a Self-reproducing Unit", in The Logic of Personal Knowledge
(Glencoe, III: 1961), p. 231.
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violation of physical laws where consciousness plays a role – is entirely
cogent so long as one accepts the tenets of orthodox quantum mechanics
in all their consequences" 1. Wigner then concludes (1) that Mind is not
subject to quantum mechanical laws (This is a significant break with
parallelism!); (2) that the Mind can influence the course of nature
by its acts, and (3) that the linear mathematical equations of the
quantum theory are unsatisfactory 2.
It has often been pointed out that the epistemology of the "orthodox"
interpretation leads to solipsism; for if the private act of observation
specifies reality by actualising its potentialities and suppressing
correlations, then the only possible explanations of the public objectivity
of science are a pre-established hannony between minds, or that there
is just one subject identical with all subjects. The first solution raises the
problem of how the harmony is pre-established, e.g., by causal
influences between different 'subjects, or by the possession of similar
a priori fonns of knowledge, etc. 3 . Reasons of simplicity and economy
have commended at least in theory the second solution, viz., solipsism,
to many physicists 4.
These are conclusions to which many quantum physicists have come
not without a considerable amount of uneasiness 5. The increasing
volume of literature on the subject witnesses, if not always to these
misgivings, at least to the feeling that the foundations of quantum
mechanics needs some maintenance and repair 6. Some physicists, like
Ludwig in his most recent paper 7, think that the validity of quantum
\

Wigner, The Scientist Speculates, p. 294
Ibid., pp. 294-298.
3 For example, P. A. Moldauer writes: "The way in which the mind reacts to information
about the physical world – and hence the structure of the wave function and of physical
theory in general – would have to be regarded as strongly conditioned by the evolutionary,
cultural and perhaps personal factors which strongly influence the structure of the human
mind", Am.
Phys., XXXII (1964), p . 172.
4 For example, Wigner, The Scientist Speculates, p. 290; and the remarks of the general
editor pp. 301-302; also Abner Shimony, lac. cit.
E. Schrödinger was the first to draw attention to this aspect of the "orthodox" theory
of measurement in "Die gegenwärtige Lage in der
Naturwissen., XXIII
(1925), pp. 807-812. Another disturbing consequence of the quantum theory of measurement
is the fact that in the absence of observations, the total entropy of the system does not
change; it changes however discontinuously after an observation.
6 For example, besides the articles referred to in notes we might mention the following
important articles: P. K. Feyerabend, "Problems in Microphysics", in Frontiers at Science
and Philosophy ed. by R. G. Colodny and C. G. Hempel (London, Allen and Unwin, 1964);
H. Margenau, "Measurements and Quantum States", Phil. Sci., xxx (1963), 1-16, 138-157;
H. Margenau and R. N. Hill, Progr. Theor. Phys., XXVI (1961), p. 727; Y. Abaronov and
D. Bohm, Phys. Rev., CXXII (1961), p. 1649; A. Lande, Zeit. f. Physik, CLXII (1961), pp. 410,
558; the articles by Lande, Teller, Born, Bopp and Ludwig in Werner Heisenberg und die
Physik unserer Zeit (Braunschweig: 1961).
7 G. Ludwig, Werner Heisenberg usw., pp. 150-181.
1
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mechanical laws should be restricted to the microscopic domain. Others,
among whom are Heisenberg and Wigner, defend its universal validity
and draw, what to them is the logical consequence, an immanentist
philosophy.

Solution 01 the Problem
To escape the immanentist tendencies for which Heisenberg and
many physicists claim to find support in the structure of quantum
mechanics itself, we shall offer our own solution of the key problem
placed by the difference between Case I and Case II.
It belongs to the scientist to choose the problem he wishes to consider
by choosing the subject matter of the problem. This is an act of the
scientist which precedes all the other acts – whether ofi calculation or
of measurement or of observation. It is the bringing to bear of a noetic
intention on something that is given or to be given in experience, namely,
publicly communicable data. These constitute the subject matter
of the problem, and are specified by the experimental procedures or
contexts appropriate to the case under consideration. The difference
in form between formula (I) and formula (II) indicates that different
ensembles of data are described by the two formulae, and different
experimental contexts are envisaged. The problem lies in interpreting
where, among the conditions listed in the text, or presupposed by these,
the difference lies.
According to the Heisenberg of the
Principles of the
Quantum Theory, the difference is due to the conversion of the pure case
into a mixture at the intermediate position, and is caused by the
undefined interactions of the apparatus of observer
without,
however, observer
making a conscious act of observation.
According to Wigner, it is
to the conscious act of observation.
Neither of these solutions is satisfactory. In the first case, the theory
predicts that, although the intermediate interactions are undefined,
and although their effect can be reduced to vanishing point
allowing
the beams to separate, the correlations characteristic of the pure case
will continue unless an observation is made. In the second case, it is
difficult to see how the merely noetic act of becoming aware of a
particular state of the apparatus can suppress, as Wigner believes,
a physical link (expressed by the superposition correlations) operative
in nature.
The answer probably lies somewhere between the two views just
criticised. The conversion from a pure case to a mixture is not a
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physical change in nature but a logical operation and results from the
choice to consider one kind of problem rather than another. It is thus
logically prior to all other acts, whether of calculation, measurement
or observation. Still in the logical order, this choice is followed by the
calculation of the mixture from the mathenlatical equations of the
appropriate pure case. The corresponding activities in the experimental
order are the erection of or attention to appropriate apparatus: 
in Case I for observer
alone, and in Case II for both observers
and
Consider now the two cases separately. In case I, the ensemble of
data is composed entirely of the results recorded by observer "Two".
In Case II, there are two independent subensembles of data; one set
and the other set recorded by observer
recorded by observer
"Two". Heisenberg has stated in the conditions governing Case II that
observer "One" does not record his observation but merely lets his
apparatus interact with the passing atoms 1. This protocol confuses
the issue, since it is clear that the individual terms in formula (II) refer
to the observations which observer "One" must be in a position to make
and to communicate. In fact, each transition probability is an ideal
frequency from which no finite recorded
diverges systematically.
The use of ideal rather than actual (counted) frequencies for the inter
mediate transition probabilities presupposes that if the actual results
were considered (in a finite sample) only random deviations would be
noted. It is in this trust in the essential validity of the ideal inter
mediate transition probabilities which is presupposed by the protocol.
It is only accidental that, in the kind of problem here proposed,
conscious acts of observation by observer
can be omitted
without changing the physics of the case. The physical interaction
involving an exchange of photons between the apparatus of observer
and the passing atoms seems, however, to be essential to the
problem and explains the physical and experimental difference
between Case I and Case II.
We have already pointed out that, even if the beams corresponding
to the different states are separated by F 1, the pure case correlation
remains, and this is responsible for the wave-like interference of the
beams with one another. The greater the separation, however, the less
the wave-like interference; and the less the separation the greater the
wave-like interference. For,
the one hand, the greater the separation,
the less energetic the exchange photon needed to establish the actual
1

Heisenberg, Physical Principles etc., p. 61.
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presence of an atom in a beam, and the less the consequent momentum
disturbance of the atom – for the breadth of each beam is supposed
to be considerable. And, on the other hand, the less the separation of the
beam, the more energetic the exchange photon needed to establish the
actual presence of an atom in a beam, and the greater the consequent
momentum disturbance of the passing atom. It is just this correlation
between the energy of the photon required to count the actual presence
of atoms in a beam and the separation of the beams which is responsible
for the physical and experimental difference between the two ensem
bles.
Physical perturbations occurring within the act of measurement are
seen to be of two kinds. One is essential to the definition of a physical
property; in the example we have chosen this
to the
perturbation which separates the states into different beams. It defines
the manner for comparing atoms – not according to their resemblances
with respect to our direct experience of them – but according to the
way they behave within a controlled ensemble of physical interactions.
The second kind of perturbation is that due to the act of observation
which involves the exchange of at least one photon with the atonlic
accounted for in
system. It is this latter perturbation which is
classical physics. It is, of course, present in every concrete observation
but classical physics is not usually concerned with it. Nor is quantum
mechanics particularly concerned with it, since, as we have shown, it
can under favorable circumstances be reduced to, an arbitrarily small
amount – provided that the states to be distinguished are not con
tinuous. The presence of this kind of perturbation at an intermediate
stage in an atomic process can, however, change the statistical corre
lations between the initial conditions and the final results; this is a
new and non-classical property.
In conclusion: we have shown in reply to (the early) Heisenberg that
the formation of a mixture from a pure case is not produced by the
physical separation of states; and in reply to Wigner,
the for
mation of the mixture is a logical step prior to all concrete acts of
observation. We conclude then that the pure case wave function is
merely a mathematical instrument with which to calculate the par
ticular mixture appropriate to the kinds of observations envisaged by
the experiment to be performed. From the arguments we have just
given, we deduce that quantum mechanics shares to the full the public
of science.

~
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Wave Function
What then is the pure case wave function? It is, in the first place,
a mathematical instrunlent of a higher logical order of abstraction
than a mixture; that is, while a mixture is an ensemble of ideal
frequencies of occurrence of values in random samples, the wave
function itself represents a potential ensemble of such mixtures, one
for every possible final experimental context which could be chosen.
The appropriate mixture can be calculated only when the final
experimental context is chosen. In the light of this interpretation the
saying of Heisenberg that modern physics no longer refers to nature
but to our knowledge of nature takes on a new significance 1. If the
object of quantum mechanics is taken to be the wave function (or the
physical state as represented by a ray in Hilbert
then this indeed
is a logical entity, i.e., a mere instrument of our knowledge of nature;
it is not a part of nature itself. Moreover, rejecting classical parallelism
in knowledge we reject also its consequence – the notion that the wave
function in configuration space or even the three-dimensional wave
packet is the real object of quantum mechanics. The real object of
quantum mechanics is its strict
This makes its appearance,
however, within the matrix of scientific method and theory and it has
to be disengaged with great care if its true visage is to be seen. It will
be the task of the next section to perform this operation.
In the second place, the wave function is connected directly with
the experimental context in which the
state is prepared.
In a time independent system, the physical state retains its direct
reference to this preparatory experimental context, i.e., it remains
an eigen state of this context 2. In the general case, however, the origi
nal state undergoes an evolution in accordance with its Schrödinger
equation. Its physical state changes deterministically in time. At any
instant, its state could be considered to be the eigen state of some
(changing) experimental context, and this state might in principle be
chosen as one of a set of basic (time dependent)
spanning the
Hilbert space of the system. This is an interpretation
what is often
called the Schrödinger picture of the system. It is of interest from the
speculative point of view, but it is not of much practical use. We are
left with the view expressed above that the pure case is primarily
a mathematical instrument of a higher logical order capable of gener
ating the set of mixtures associated with a determinate set of final
1

2

Heisenberg, Physicist's Conception of Nature, p. 15.
See appendix where a simple time independent case is considered.
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experimental arrangements. Only when the final experimental context
is chosen is the physicist in possession of a formula (namely, a mixture)
which refers directly to concrete physical reality, i.e., to the verifiable
behaviour of physical things. The mixture then represents essentially
a correlation between a certain initial (or preparatory) experimental
context and a definite final one. The peculiar properties of the wave
function, e.g., its characteristic wave-like properties, is then to be
explained by the way different matrices of transition probabilities
(between initial and final states) are mathematically connected.
has shown that the law of interference of probabilities is identical
with the law of unitary transformation of magic squares of transition
probabilities when certain very reasonable symmetry conditions are
fulfilled 1. While we do not wish to pass judgement on the epistemo
logical assumptions behind Lande's polemic against
Copenhagen
School, we think that his search for a realistic interpretation of
quantum mechanics is a reasonable one, and that his proof that the
wave function need be no more than a logical instrument connecting
an ensemble of mixtures (or an ensemble of
magic square
probability tables") is an important contribution to the epistemology
of quantum mechanics.

SECTION IV: FORMAL OBJECTIVITY

Formal and Public Obiectivity
Public objectivity and formal objectivity differ in this respect, that
while the former is defined by public understanding, use and definition,
the latter is concerned with the part of the public object which is
affirmed to belong to the domain of being. This supposes a rather
different kind of analysis of the scientific object from that which
merely vindicates an object of knowledge from the subjectivity of
private and incommunicable experience; for even Kant
assume
that people could agree in thought, language, experience and scientific
principles without implying that the objects which they affirmed were
objects in the formal sense, i.e., belonging to the transcendent domain
of being, and he sought the a priori conditions of possibility of the
public object among the synthetic pure a priori principles which human
sensibility and understanding must possess. Public objects, then, in the
1

A. Lande,
pp. 4 1 -54.

19 60 ),

Dualism to Unity in Quantum Physics (Cambridge: Cambro Univ. Press,
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Kantian explanation, were subjective
the formal objectivity
of being except that they retained a symbolic vestige of noumenal
reality through their correlation with a noumenal object which,
however, was otherwise unknowable.
The first stage in the treatment of formal objectivity in science will
be to distinguish in the public object what belongs properly to the
content of that object, and what belongs to the method of expressing
this content, characteristic of the human scientific way of knowing.
For it is only the content to which formal objectivity is attributed;
while public objectivity may include both the content and the method
of expressing it without too much discrimination provided a common
understanding is achieved. It is not surprising then that the distinction
between formal object and scientific method has
been largely over
. ,
looked. The failure, however, to draw a correct line between method
and object in human science leads, as we have seen, to perplexing
problems in quantum mechanics, not merely on the philosophic level
of interpretation but on the scientific level of public objectivity.
How is the strict object of a scientific statement to be disentangled
from its public object? The public object is whatever can be commonly
understood and correctly used by alL The strict object is the content
of a critical scientific assertion, based upon the evidence of a process
of experimental testing and verification:
and such is so". The
content of the strict object is denoted by such and such; the criterion
of its formal objectivity is the scientific
leading to the strong
use of the verb to be; viz.,
so". The
may be a factual
assertion or a theoretical assertion. If a theoretical assertion, we take
it to be converted into a set of hypothetical factual statements of the
type:
appropriate data are given, then such and such is so".
The formal objectivity of a well-tested critical scientific statement
can be contrasted with its correlate which is the subjectivity of a mere
supposition or hypothesis. It can be contrasted also with the public
but not formal objectivity of, say, a mythic explanation, which is an
explanation where symbol and reality, method and object are not
separated but indissolubly united. Formal objectivity is acquired only
progressively by a theory as consciousness of its epistemological
structure and evidence in its favour accumulate, until something
approaching a definitive judgement can be made of its validity within a
well-defined domain delineated by operational and observational
concepts. The ultimate goal of scientific activity is the making of such
definite, unconditional, and final judgements.
the realm of the
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exact sciences", Heisenberg wrote, "there have always been final
solutions for certain limited domains of experience... The word
'final' ... means that there are always self-contained, mathematically
representable, systems of concepts and laws applicable to certain
realms of experience, in which realms they are always valid for the
entire cosmos and cannot be changed or improved" 1.
The success, however, of this epistemological analysis of content
and method is not a necessary condition of scientific progress, as the
Kantian experiment has shown; for science can continue to make
new discoveries and new syntheses, even when method and object
are inextricably linked in the scientist's mind, and even if the meaning
of "existence", "being" and "reality" are very much in doubt.
In this section, we shall try merely to separate what is affirmed viz.,
the content of the strict object in quantum mechanics, from what
belongs to the human way of scientific knowing and so is not affirmed.
We shall leave to another chapter the ontological problem of es
tablishing the conditions under which what is correctly affirmed is
truly being. We are concerned now merely with the physiognomy of
the strict quantum object as possibly being.

i

W ave-Particle Duality Re-interpreted
In attacking psycho-physical parallelism for giving a false expla
nation of scientific method, we implied also a rejection on our part of
the wave-particle duality of complementarity, which is a consequence
of this view of scientific knowledge.
In rejecting the wave-particle duality of complementarity, we do
not, however, wish to imply that some of the mathematical formulae
should be changed or that observational results are not adequately
accounted for by the theory. There may be inadequacies in the
quantum theory, but we are not concerned with them here 2. Nor
do we wish to imply that wave and particle models are useless, either
as supports of our thinking or as symbolic images or as
clues
to further investigation. The witness of a generation of physicists proves
how useful these 1.re. Nor do we imply finally that wave-particle
duality should be dropped in favour of anyone of the following:
(a) a unitary "matter-particle" theory, as Popper, Bopp, Feynes,
Heisenberg, Physicist's Conception oj Nature, pp. 26-27 (italics our own).
We have already noted above (chap. v, p. 96) that many physicists, as, for example,
Wigner, Ludwig, Bohm, etc., purpose to change the form of the equations of quantum
mechanics, for reasons connected with the basic epistemology of the "orthodox" interpre
tation.
1

2
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Vigier and
have proposed 1; (b) a unitary "matter-wave"
theory like Schrödinger's 2; or (c) a classical combination of "matter
waves" and "matter-particles" like de Broglie or Bohm have pro
posed 3. All of these Heisenberg has explicitly rejected because
motivated by what he calls the "ontology of materialism" charac
teristic of classical physics 4. By a "matter-particle" we mean a
bodily reality, possessing at every instant a unique set of space and
momentum coordinates – whether or not these are actually and
simultaneously determinable; it is then a strictly localised reality. By
a "matter-wave" we mean an extended medium whose properties obey
a wave equation, and vary continuously and determinately in time –
whether or not the properties are simultaneously and actually determi
nable. It is then a non-localised bodily reality. These correspond to the
two separate "pictures" of complementarity and belong to co-ordinate
(three-dimensional) space. There is another kind of wave, called a
wave function, which is not a bodily wave, but a mathematical function
on a configuration space of 3n-dimensions – where n is the number
of particles 5. This latter wave does not possess bodily objectivity, but
does possess the public objectivity of a scientific object.
Our view is that the "matter-particle" and the "matter-wave" are
merely real or possible observable symbols of the strict objects of physics.
They are the sensible sign of the strict object, and they serve the
double purpose: (I) of being the criterion
us of the reality of the
strict object, since through the observable symbol the physical object

;
l

:

1 K. Popper, The Logic of Scientilic Discovery, (London: 1959), chap. IX; Observation and
Interpretation, ed. S. Korner, pp. 65-70; F. Bopp,
Heisenberg usw., pp. 128-149;
Ann. l'Inst. H.
tm. xv (1956), pp. 8I-II2; J. P. Vigier, Observation and Interpre
tation, pp. 71-77; 1. Feynes, Zeit. f. Physik, CXXXII (1952), p. 81.
2 E. Schrödinger, "Are there Quantum Jumps?",
Jour. Phil. Sci., III (1952), pp. 109,
233·
3 L. de Broglie, Non-Linear Wave Mechanics (Amsterdam: 1960); D. Bohm, Causality and
Chance in Modern Physics (New York: 1957) pp. 68-128; Observation and Interpretation,
Pp·33-4 0 .
4 Heisenberg uses the term materialism loosely. In the first place,
/pays scant attention
to the principal philosophic implication of the term, which is the exclusion of spirit in any but
a subordinate role to matter. His thought is concerned principally with mechanistic expla
nations of nature. Cf. Heisenberg, Physicist's Conception of Nature, pp. 13-15. In the second
place, he confuses dialectical materialism with mechanistic materialism and assumes wrongly
that they share the same outlook on nature. Dialectical materialism, while not mechanistic,
is opposed to Heisenberg's epistemology principally because it is a form of realism which lays
. claim to know physical reality objectively, i.e., in the context, to know it as it is in itself
independently of the private subjectivity of the scientist-observer. Cf., Heisenberg, Niels Bohr
etc., pp. 21-22; G. Wetter, Philosophie und Wissenschalt in
Sowjetunion (Munich: Ro
wohlts deutsche Enzyklopadie 67, 1958), pp. 7-38 and especially p . 37 where Heisenberg
is criticised on this latter point.
Physical Principles etc., Preface.
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enters our World of reality; and (2) of yielding a measure-number for
the strict object, in so far as the content of the observable symbol is a
numbered content. Contrariety of symbol, however, does not imply
contrariety of the essential object symbolised. The consistency and
formal unity of the atomic system is expressed by a non-contradictory
mathematical theory. Heisenberg was aware of this, and used it to
justify the paradoxical character of complementary pictures 1. Our
view in practice
the indeterminacy of wave and particle
symbolic representations differs then very little in practice from that
of Heisenberg and other complementarity physicists, but we attribute
a very different epistemological significance to it.

V arious Unitary Re-interpretations
Before summarising our view of the content of the strict object of
quantum mechanics, we shall consider some recent opinions which try
to dissolve wave-particle duality into a unitary particle theory. Bopp
has proposed that the quantum mechanical object is a matter-particle
with six determinate phase-space coordinates, viz., three of mo
mentum (P) and three of position (q), only half of which at any instant
are detenninable 2. This led him to experiment
various forms of
non-classical statistical mechanics. The kind of object he proposed for
such a theory was a virtual ensemble of "determinate but half
determinable" classical particles. He did not fully succeed. He was
able, however, to prove a theorem of great
and interest which
reads: "Any quantum mechanical system, pure and mixed states
included, can be mapped into a statistical ensemble of particles in a
certain phase-space: and hence also, every quantum mechanical
process can be correlated to a movement of this ensemble" 3. The
conclusion of his research, however, was that his "determinate but
half-determinable" phase-space was not the phase-space of quantum
mechanics.
The reason for this negative conclusion is interesting;
in some
scientific
respects, Bopp's theory is a test case of Proposition (1)
method 4, which is a characteristic of the early view of comple
mentarity as it was proposed and defended by Bohr and Heisenberg.
Cf.
chap. II, p. 37.
Bopp, Werner Heisenberg usw., loc.
Observation and Interpretation, pp. 189-196;
Ann. l'Inst. H.
xv (1956), pp. 81-II2. Cf., Heisenberg's remarks in Niels
etc.,
pp. 19-20 .
3 Bopp. Observation and I nterpretation, loc. cit.
Cf., supra, chap. IV, p. 57.
1

2
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It will be recalled that this states that quantum mechanical variables
are defined through the use of classical concepts. Bopp's theory applies
this principle, to which he adds the restriction typical of the quantum
theory, viz., that the classical variables should be determinable only
within the limits imposed by the Indeterminacy Relations. Bopp's
theory is a serious attempt to translate one aspect of the epistemology
of complementarity (as explained by Bohr and Heisenberg) into a
physical theory. A confirmation of this can be found in the fact
Heisenberg criticised Bopp's approach merely because it lacked the
symmetry between wave and particle which an
quantum
theory must have and not because this modified return to classical
assumptions was contrary to the quantum theory. The failure of
Bopp's theory was, then, a failure of one aspect of complementarity,
that which links the definition of quantum
variables to
classical concepts.
Our own rejection of Bopp's assumptions follows clearly from the
distinction we have made between operational concepts based upon
experimental techniques, and explanatory concepts based upon the
understanding of a set of interrelated processes. A physical property
is expressed by us as a union of both types of concepts. Position and
momentum share the same operational description in classical and in
quantum mechanics, but they have different explanatory definitions.
The non-commutation of position and momentum operators introduces
an essentially new element in the
definition of both: hence,
the p and q of quantum mechanics mean
different from the
p and q of classical mechanics 1. Since the meanings are evidently
related, and merge in fact in the limit of h = 0, we can call them
analogous meanings 2. To assume, as Bopp does, that they mean the same
univocally but that in the quantum mechanical case they are obser
vationally indeterminate is
misunderstand the logic of scientific
method. It is the same misunderstanding which leads to the pertur
bation theory of measurement. It is contrary to our intention, however,
to minimise the value of Bopp's undertaking which has received
1 This point has been stressed by N. R. Hanson in Patterns of Discovery (Cambridge : 1958),
chap. VI and in his Concept of the Positron (Cambridge: 1963), chaps. IV-VIII; also by
Büchel, in "Die Diskussion um die Interpretation der Quantenphysik" , Scholastik, XXIX
(1954) pp. 235-244, and in "Individualität und Wechselwirkung im Bereich des materiellen
Seins", Scholastik, XXXI (1956), pp. 1-30.
2 There are three kinds of analogy: metaphor, metonymy or extrinsic attribution, and
intrinsic proportionality; d ., F. Selvaggi,
de l'analogie dans les theories physiques",
in Actes du XIe
Internat. de Philos .. VI (Amsterdam-Louvain: 1953), pp. 138-143.
The analogy in question in the text is most likely that of intrinsic proportionality.
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Heisenberg's praise 1, but in our view its principal value is that it
has tested, with what results we have seen, one of the basic theses of
complementarity 2.
Lande, though he speaks of a unitary particle theory, does not make
the mistake of defining p and q classically 3. He accepts the quantum
mechanical definition by non-commuting operators, and confines his
re-interpretation to a statistical explanation of the wave function. For
this reason, we are inclined to think that Lande's work is more ac
ceptable than Bopp's because it is consistent with the present form
of the quantum theory.
The Strict Object of Quantum Mechanics
We shall gather together here much that we have already said
relevant to the strict object of quantum mechanics. It is our view that
quantum mechanics is a new kind of physical theory in which both
deterministic and statistical elements are organically and inseparably
united 4.
From our general analysis of scientific method, we derive the
proposition that the object in the strict sense of a physical theory is
not per se representable in sensibility, and
sensibility only
per accidens through the presentation of an observable symbol 5. A
thing or property is per se representable in sensibility if, as an object
of knowledge, it is essentially constituted as the subject of typical
appearances or as the typical instrument for
performance by a
\
human subject of a certain kind of external function or for the ful
filment of a human desire. A body in the strict sense, for example, and
the properties of bodies are per se representable in sensibility. An
t

"

1 Heisenberg writes that Bopp's theory "throws light upon the interesting relation between
quantum theory and correlation statistics", Niels Bohr etc., p. 20.
2 We have based our argument for the essential irreducibility of quantum mechanical
systems upon the results of Bopp's research rather than upon the more famous theorem of
von Neumann (Mathematical Foundations etc., pp. 295-313) proving the non-existence of
dispersion-free ensembles in quantum mechanics, for Bopp's "determinate
nable" ensemble fulfills the conditions of von Neumann's theorem, but is still
to be
a classical, determinate ensemble. It seems, then, that von Neumann's
in spite of
a widespread opinion to the contrary, does not exclude the kind of "hidden variables"
conceived by Bopp. For this reason, we consider the results of Bopp's research more
fundamen tal.
3 A. Lande, From Dualism to Unity in Quantum Physics, (Cambridge: 1960).
4 The statistical elements in question refer to what in classical physics would be called a
"distribution of errors" .
5 Mach, Rankine and others divided physical theories into abstractive theories dealing with
perceptible objects, as for example, Newtonian mechanics; and hypothetical theories which
used imperceptible hypothetical constructs, like atoms, electrons. etc., We hold this dis
tinction to be unfounded.
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object of human scientific knowledge which is not per se representable
in sensibility is per accidens representable in sensation, as, for example,
through its observable symbol.
The proposition stated in the preceding paragraph applies both to
physical properties and to the subjects of these properties, viz., to
things. A physical property is the ground for a certain kind of inter
activity between things. Hence it founds a symmetrical thing-to-thing
relation. The human way of discerning the presence of this activity,
then, is to study to recognise its effects on other things; these effects
when transformed, magnified or otherwise processed by instrumental
arrangements are the observable symbols in which the physical
property is observed. It is not excluded that a physical property may
be also per se representable in sensibility, but it would be difficult to
establish an exact correlation between a unique sensible effect and one
of the well-defined properties of physics. Usually the types of sensation
correlated with physical properties are vague and composite. "The
objective [scientific] concept of temperature", Weyl wrote, "is pretty
far removed from the sense data of heat perception" 1. The sense data,
on the one hand, ground an observational or operational concept. The
property studied in physics, on the other
is a thing-to-thing
relation founded upon a self-correlated set of physical processes, and
so is expressed by an explanatory concept.
If physical processes are not per se representable in sensibility, then
neither is it necessary that the subjects which possess them should
be per se representable in sensibility. A subject of physical properties
is the common term of a set of relations founded upon interactivities
between subjects. There is nothing in this definition which states
whether such a subject is representable in sensation; and, if so, whether
this is per se or per accidens. That the subject and its properties be
somehow representable in sensibility follows from the fact that we,
as human knowers, need a criterion of physical reality. As to how the
subject is representable in sensation, the definition does not exclude
per se representability. Macroscopic physical objects
represented
in this way, but this does not belong to the definition of a physical
object as the subject of physical properties, viz., as a thing.
Since the things which are quantum mechanical systems are not
per se imaginable, it is not necessary to suppose that they are, or
should be, representable in classical phase-space. A consequence of this
is that we do not need to postulate the existence of "hidden variables"
1

H. Weyl, Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science, p.

140.
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to explain the statistical laws of quantum mechanics. Moreover,
quantum mechanics may be essentially, though not purely as we hold,
a statistical theory; but we do not need to assume that it is or should
be one of a classical or stochastic type.
From our analysis of quantum mechanics as a physical theory, we
derive the proposition that the strict object of quantum mechanics is not
an idealised formula of an individual system, but the individual and
concrete instance of a physical system. We have already shown that
individual and concrete instances can only be expressed as a virtual
ensemble of cases. Quantum mechanics accounts both for the simi
larities between members of the ensemble – this is the determi
nistic part of the theory – and for the divergence between these
part of
members as far as this is possible– this is the
the theory. The function of quantum mechanics as a' deterministic
theory is twofold: viz., to define by implicit definition the set of related
processes which found the quantum physical properties, and to define
the idealised formula, i.e., the wave function, to which the members
of the ensemble conform more or less and by which the members are
defined as members of the particular ensemble. The function of
quantum mechanics as a statistical theory is to describe the way
individual and concrete instances of the properties are distributed in
an ensemble of similar systems, i.e., of systems characterised by the
same wave function. Within the ensemble, individual instances are
random and unsystematic with respect to the
of their occurrence,
but their relative frequencies of occurrence cluster around a formula
which is described by the statistical part of the theory. Since all
quantum mechanical variables, including position and momentum, are
defined by the deterministic part of quantum mechanics, we conclude
that it is methodologically incorrect to try to construct a classical
(whether deterministic or statistical) model of quantum mechanics.

Matter-Form
If neither the physical system nor its properties are
se repre
sentable in sensibility, what then is the structure of such an object?
In the first place, the Kantian distinction between matter and form
is no longer applicable; for the matter received into intuition is not
incorporated intrinsically in the constitution of the strict object. The
intuitive matter is part of the observable symbol, and so is extrinsic
to the strict object as constituted an object of knowledge.
In the second place, a matter and form distinction, but not of a
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Kantian type, is an intrinsic part of the strict object. The strict object
is expressed by the content affirmed in a factual statement about an
actual individual system. This content is precise and determinate only
in so far as the individual system is expressed correctly in a definite
state-function; the state-function, however, is an idealisation common
to a virtual ensemble. The content is irreducibly indeterminate in so far
as neither the future nor the past of the system can be fully recon
structed from this knowledge, but only the future and past of the
virtual ensemble which the state-function concretely represents. The
virtual ensemble, however, represents a precise distribution only
because it too is an idealisation conceived as the limiting case of an
infinite ensemble; or as an ideal norm from which large finite samples
do not systematically diverge. Hence individual cases taken in their
concreteness are not precisely defined or definable in quantum me
chanics; and moreover the element of indeterminateness is irreducible.
A strict object with two such contradictory sets of properties cannot
be a simple unity. It has a factor within it on which the similarity is
grounded and it has some other factor on which the dissimilarity is
grounded. Since the element of dissimilarity is irreducible to precise
differences, it should be regarded rather as an openness to an indefinite
multiplicity – one which is ruled by the ideal frequencies predicted by
the wave function. If we call the ground of multiplicity, irreducible
matter, and the ground of similarity, form, then the strict object has
a matter and foml structure which is
to its structure, and
which is not, moreover, of the Kantian
We shall return to this
discussion in chapter IX.
Summary
The "orthodox" account of the quantum mechanical measuring
process insists on the presence of an inescapable "subjective element"
in it and consequently in the heart of quantum mechanics as a physical
science. We distinguish three kinds of 0 bj ectivity :
obj ectivity,
public objectivity and formal objectivity, to which correspond three
kinds of objects; namely, empirical objects, public objects and objects
in the strict or formal sense. Empirical objectivity is the characteristic
of an object of classical physics; public objectivity is the characteristic
of an object of science, and formal objectivity is the characteristic of
Being as known. We defend the public objectivity of quantum me
chanics, and then attempt to separate in the public physical object the
elements which belong respectively to human scientific method, and
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to the content of the object in the strict sense. We show that the di
vision between causal (or deterministic) theory and statistical theory
is one of human scientific method, and that quantum mechanics is a
new kind of theory in which both kinds of theories are united or
ganically and inseparably. The reason for this is that quantum me
chanics takes as its object in the strict or
sense the individual
instance of an ideal norm; that is, reality in its concrete manifestations.
We infer, moreover, an intrinsic matter-form structure in the strict
object of quantum mechanics.

•

I

